Something I have familiarity with is MAN TO MAN COVERAGE (and how to beat it).  On a State Championship team in Texas (Shameless plug: Go Cats!), our coverage schemes were almost purely man coverage.  Then, I graduated and played at Texas, where DBs actually had black t-shirts emblazoned with the motto “Real men play man-to-man” – every day in practice was a grueling, 2 hour challenge on beating press against a defensive backs room was littered with All Conference and All American players. But – this all made me a better player.  And, it made me realize that pressure was many times brought on THE OFFENSE.   After the Seahawks destroyed the Broncos in Super Bowl 48, this point was made HERE.

Many people will incorrectly associate man coverage with pressure.  While it is true that teams can blitz out of man coverage, recent study has revealed a higher percentage of zone blitzes at many levels.  A man coverage call will not cause a pass rusher to “rush harder”; what happens many times is that the offense, because it has not effectively prepared itself to deal with (and dispose of) man coverage, will resort to tactics that take the onus off the play caller, but add to the burden of the player.  One example, and a personal pet peeve of mine, is calling exclusively quick routes in this situation.  As someone who has been asked to run a slant vs. an inside leverage corner over and over again, I can attest that it is not an easy task!  Neither is expecting a completion on fade after fade.  What the QB needs is to see separation; what the receiver needs is the opportunity to make the defender indecisive, to turn his hips, and the chance to separate.

As with many cases, the New England Patriots teach us a great deal about football common sense.   I went back into the last few drives in their epic comeback against the Falcons, in which the point is made demonstrated – one must maintain a diverse attack vs. man coverage, and feature route stems that allow people to separate.  

To the casual observer, this looks like a simple check-down off of smash, but the brilliance is in the details.   The receiver (a RB no less) doesn’t just run a 5-yard in; he creates separation with a fake “sluggo” move – “the stair step” backs the defender off and allows an easy completion.

​In the same drive, the Patriots faced a 4th and 3.  Once again, the pattern gave Brady 2 options that fit our criteria.   The pattern also gives quick rhythm throws vs zone; we refer to these as advantage routes.

​The first touchdown of the comeback is scored on a pretty typical pattern in this situation; of possible interest is the propensity of the Atlanta defense to play zone in the scoring zone, despite majoring in man coverage elsewhere.  Of note to this basic pattern structure is that the Patriots seem to have an entire series of adjustments; the one run on this play features a “shake” route to feature vs. match coverage.

The ability to max protect in addition to free releasing 5 receivers is illustrated. The Patriots use the TE and RB to check for blitzers, then “chip” before releasing, and throw a deep comeback off of a stutter-go stem.  The route stem puts the defender in doubt, and once again attacks based on the premise that man defenders need to be made to cover; man defenders’ abilities are enhanced with solely quick throws.  The drive results in a field goal, bringing the score to 28-12.

​The pattern used in which the Falcons got a “pick six” has been widely analyzed.  New England’s adjustments within play focus, however, are given much less attention.  From 3x1 sets moving forward from the interception, the Patriots attacked the single receiver side vs. 1 high, and the multiple receiver side vs 2 high.  We’ve simplified this reading process with our “9er” Advantage Principle.  A critical 3rd & 11 is converted with just over 7 minutes in the game…

In the scoring zone on the same drive, Brady & Co. encounter 2 Read once again at the 6.  Using a combination New England uses frequently down here, the inside receiver runs a “read” route (basically an 8-yard option route), while the outside receiver has the option of getting open on the back line, or running a fade vs Cover 2, which opens up space for the read route to break out. 

​Now 28-20 with 3:17 left in the game, the Patriots face 3rd and 10 on the -9.  Deftly picking up the blitz from the slot defender, they are able to defeat a zone blitz scheme with a “SAIL” (our term for “7 After Inside Leverage) route.  Why is this discussed in a man coverage article?  Because the man techniques are often applied within a zone; the Falcons even bring over #32 to match with the Pats’ Hogan.  There is not only the theme of sound protection principles (avoiding “hot” throws when possible in long yardage situations), but the principle of the offense not succumbing to the defense’s desire to allow the quick, easy throw and rally downhill on the ball.

​With 2:34 left in the game, the New England offense again goes with a 3x1 set, and again attacks the single receiver, as another comeback route is thrown and caught as a defender must open his hips on deeper stems.  

Right after Edelman's circus catch that will forever be on future highlight videos, the Pats get right back down to the common sense approach to offense, this time with what we call a "Bengal."

In overtime, the onslaught continues, as the offense breaks down the ability to react of the defenders.   It needs to be emphasized that the calls we are highlighting ALLOW for even more soft, easy completions.   It is the ability to make defenders play on their heels that allows for prolonged success and possessions, which also affects the pass rush.   

As mentioned in the clip, it seems as people get caught up in RPOs and utlra-fast tempo, there is a problem when that IS ALL a team does.  There are fundamental principles to attacking defenses that are forgotten many times.   We are then reminded to look at models of simplicity and common sense to put us back on track.

The point of evolution is to give rise to diversity, and ensure the survival of a given species.  A good offensive system is a living thing, and likewise, must evolve.   Homer Smith, perhaps the most intellectual football coach of all time, taught me that great pass patterns generated more of themselves.   
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Many of the lessons Coach Smith shared with me still live on in our QB manual:

In order to have the ability to evolve, a truly complete system must be able to adapt to the personnel available in a given season, in addition to giving the coach the ability to truly turn the players loose behind the full firepower of the offense.
Some key points to consider:

• A way to teach beyond rote memorization.  Here, we are specifically referring to the quarterback.   Some schools of thought lock the passer into a set progression for a given play; however, with the way patterns are structured here, we give flexibility (and, moreover, situational awareness) to the attack.  This can be done because the verbiage allows for understanding on the part of the QB, combined with the allowance for skill players to just “play fast.”  We use numbers to dictate the frontside of the route, and names for the backside.   We are able to mix-and-match patterns, allowing us not only to maximize our best player’s abilities, but allow us to capitalize on valuable practice time as well.  

• Defeat all coverage categories, but have special consideration for defeating MAN COVERAGE.  Because we can add looks without having to re-teach assignments, valuable planning and practice time can be spent on skill development and technique.  In doing so, combined with the manner in which patterns can be assembled, viable answers can be provided.  More and more, even zone coverages have man-to-man elements involved, so it is important that separation techniques are prioritized. 

The point is also made that simply resorting to “quick throws” vs man actually plays into the defense’s hands.    This hypothesis has never been made clearer than observing results from several Super Bowls involving Dan Quinn-coached defenses.  After the 2014 season, the Denver Broncos’ record-setting offense was derailed by the pressure defense of the Seahawks.   Part of the problem was the philosophical approach of the Broncos – to combat man coverage with predominantly quick throws.   A write-up of that theory can be found here.  The problem is, if only throwing quickly – defenders are never truly pressured, as they don’t have to cover very long.  This plays right into the defense’s hands.
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In 2 of the next 3 Super Bowls, the Patriots encountered the same defensive structure and philosophy (the Seahawks in Super Bowl 49, and the Falcons in Super Bowl 51), and threw 37 and 43 completions, respectively.  While it is easy to point to the skill of the quarterback, few would argue that Brady plays with receivers who are on the lower end of the NFL’s skill spectrum.  How did they do this?  By making man coverage players ACTUALLY have to cover, and by attacking interior defenders who found themselves in peculiar positions, the Patriots were able to possess the ball when others could not.  Simply, they made man defenders turn their hips.  

On a high school or college field, offenses can get some very similar match ups, as zone teams will rely on man techniques in match-up zone coverages.  In the following teaching clips, it is easy to see how the principles explained can be valuable.

• SPOT – our acronym for “SPEED IN WITH AN OUTSIDE 2”, it places a skilled player at a #3 position to attack the MIKE linebacker, usually the last linebacker a defense will substitute for.  

In surveying the landscape of many offensive systems, there is a feeling that points are being left on the field in many instances.  Though many teams have similar basic structures, features are not put in place that assure the maximization of the tools at hand.   Most of us coach in situations where the traditional talent is not overwhelming to the opposition; it is thus the responsibility of the coach to make the difference and maximize potential.